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Abstract. We investigate defenses against DNS cache poisoning focus-
ing on mechanisms that can be readily deployed unilaterally by the re-
solving organisation, preferably in a single gateway or a proxy. DNS
poisoning is (still) a major threat to Internet security; determined spoof-
ing attackers are often able to circumvent currently deployed antidotes
such as port randomisation. The adoption of DNSSEC, which would foil
DNS poisoning, remains a long-term challenge.
We discuss limitations of the prominent resolver-only defenses, mainly
port and IP randomisation, 0x20 encoding and birthday protection. We
then present two new (unilateral) defenses: the sandwich antidote and
the NAT antidote. The defenses are simple, effective and efficient, and
can be implemented in a gateway connecting the resolver to the Internet.
The sandwich antidote is composed of two phases: poisoning-attack de-
tection and then prevention. The NAT antidote adds entropy to DNS
requests by switching the resolver’s IP address to a random address (be-
longing to the same autonomous system). Finally, we show how to imple-
ment the birthday protection mechanism in the gateway, thus allowing
to restrict the number of DNS requests with the same query to 1 even
when the resolver does not support this.
Keywords: DNS security, unilateral defenses, cache poisoning.
1 Introduction
Correct and efficient operation of the DNS is essential for the operation of the
Internet. However, there is a long history of vulnerabilities and exploits related
to DNS; for some of the early works, see the seminal papers of Vixie [30] and
Bellovin [7, 8].
In the recent years, the most significant attack on the Domain Name System
is DNS poisoning by a spoofing attacker. The spoofer tries to provide the DNS
resolver with misleading mappings (e.g., map VIC-Bank.com to an IP address
controlled by the attacker), by sending a fake (spoofed) response to a domain
name query. The DNS poisoning scenario by a spoofing adversary typically as-
sumes either an open recursive resolver, i.e., one that provides services to clients
outside of its network, or a compromised client on the local network (LAN),
e.g., a zombie; the DNS poisoning model is in Figure 1. DNS poisoning can be
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used as a building block facilitating many other attacks, such as the injection of
malware, phishing, website hijacking/defacing and denial of service.
When the DNS resolver receives a DNS response, it usually follows the rec-
ommendations in [18] and checks that the validation fields match the fields in
one of the pending DNS requests. The DNS request contains several validation
fields, e.g., transaction ID, which are also copied to the DNS response by the
authoritative name server. The local DNS resolver that issued the DNS query
validates that those fields appear correctly in the DNS response. If all the fields
in the DNS response are correct, the response is cached and then sent to the
client that issued the request. Otherwise, if one of the fields is incorrect, the DNS
resolver ignores response. Once the DNS response is cached, the attacker has to
wait until the TTL (time to live) expires so that it can initiate the attack again.
Although poisoning attacks on DNS were known to be devastating, this threat
was believed to be impractical, since frequently accessed domain names typically
reside in the cache of the DNS resolver, thus preventing the attacker from poi-
soning those domains of interest. Furthermore, if the legitimate response from
the authentic DNS server arrives before the forgery sent by the attacker, forgery
attempt fails, as the resolver will cache the first response and ignore the rest.
This situation changed when Kaminsky presented an improved attack [20,
10], with two critical improvements. The first improvement was to control the
time at which the resolver sends queries (to which the attacker wishes to re-
spond), by sending to the resolver queries for a (non-existing) host name, e.g.,
with a random or sequential prefix of the domain name. The second improvement
was to add, in the spoofed responses sent to the resolver, a type NS DNS record
(specifying a new name for the domain name server) and/or a type A ‘glue’ DNS
record (specifying the IP address of the new domain name server). These records
poison the resolver’s entries for a specific host in the victim’s domain, e.g., the
victim’s name server itself. Hence, if the attack succeeds once (for one record),
the adversary controls the entire name space of the victim. If the attack fails for
a given host name (prefix), the attacker can repeat with new (random) prefix.
Using these two improvements attackers can often poison the DNS entry
for the victim domain (e.g., VIC-Bank.com) within few seconds, when the only
unpredictable field in the DNS response is the 16-bit ID field, thus allowing
devastating attacks on many Internet applications (see [20, 10]).
As a result of Kaminsky attack, it became obvious that changes are needed
to prevent DNS poisoning. Indeed, major DNS resolvers were quickly patched
to support source port randomisation, i.e., use and validate random source ports
for each request or at least for each destination IP. Resolvers were also improved
to support birthday protection: prevent or limit1 duplicate concurrent requests.
Both of these defenses were proposed by Bernstein already in [9].
However, as noted by [21, 14], a determined attacker with sufficient band-
width, e.g., controlling a large amount of compromised machines on the Internet,
could still send a sufficient number of responses to have a forged DNS response
1 Complete prevention of duplicate queries may have significant overhead on popular
resolver implementations, hence most implementations only limit duplicates.
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accepted with high probability. Furthermore, port randomisation is often an-
nihilated due to port-mangling by NAT devices between the resolver and the
Internet [17, 26, 12].
Additional, easy to deploy defense requiring changes to the local DNS resolver
only, RFC 5452 [18], specifies that DNS resolvers should, where possible, not only
choose a random source port, but also choose a random source IP address and a
random authoritative server IP address for each query. The resolver should then
validate that the same IP addresses are used in the response. If the resolver uses
a set of NS IP addresses, and the authoritative name server uses a set of ND
IP addresses, then the space of identifiers is increased by a factor of NS · ND.
However, the impact is usually modest, as NS is often only one, and ND is at
most three.
Indeed, recent studies, [19, 16], indicate that DNS is not well protected
against poisoning attacks and that the vast majority of organisations with an
Internet presence are still vulnerable to DNS poisoning attacks. In particular,
the ongoing attacks on DNS infrastructure, e.g., AT&T, Comcast and Rolling-
stone [32, 11, 23], motivate inspection of the ‘easy-to-deploy’, unilateral defenses
such as those against spoofing adversaries.
Cryptographic defenses, e.g., DNSSEC [4, 6, 5], offer protection against a
stronger man-in-the-middle adversary, and are thus a preferable alternative over
defenses against spoofers. However, their deployment remains to be seen due to
the significant changes that they introduce to the current DNS infrastructure.
Recent survey results, [19, 16], reveal that some fundamental capabilities re-
quired for adoption of DNSSEC, e.g., support of queries over TCP and support
of EDNS0 [29], are not fully deployed. Furthermore, common to the defenses
against MitM adversaries is the requirement for a cooperation and support of
the mechanism by both parties to the DNS transaction, which is a significant
overhaul. In contrast, unilateral defenses against spoofers allow an organisation
or an ISP to integrate the defense, without relying on the support by the other
end to the DNS transaction.
In this work, we focus on antidotes to DNS poisoning that require modifica-
tion to the local DNS resolver only, which, preferably, can also be implemented
in a router/firewall machine connecting the resolver to the Internet (we discuss
advantages of firewall based defenses in Section 1.1).
Our proposed defenses meet all the proposed design guidelines of [24]: (1) the
prevention techniques should require no change to the DNS protocol; (2) should
not introduce service disruption; (3) the solution should be completely backward
compatible with existing DNS servers, and transparent to users; and finally (4)
it should make poisoning attacks infeasible.
Our first technique is the sandwich antidote, presented in Section 3. This is
an efficient and simple procedure, based on a two stage defense: upon the receipt
of a forged DNS response, an attack is detected; then, the attack is prevented by
discarding the ‘malicious’ DNS responses and accepting only a valid authentic
DNS response.
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Fig. 1. Simple configuration for DNS poisoning by a spoofing adversary (Eve) on the
Internet: client Alice uses a resolver connected to the Internet. The resolvers make
queries to authoritative name servers, via the Internet. We consider a blind/spoofing
adversary Eve, connected to the Internet. The adversary may also control some ‘puppet’
connected to the same local area network as Alice and the resolver.
Our second technique is the NAT antidote, Section 4. The NAT antidote
extends the existing Network Address Translation devices and adds entropy to
DNS requests, thus significantly increasing the amount of forged packets that
the attacker is required to generate in order to produce the correct forged DNS
response.
We also show how to implement the birthday protection in firewall. The
mechanism restricts the number of outgoing DNS requests for the same query
to 1, even if the local DNS resolver does not limit concurrent requests for the
same resource record.
We implemented our proposed defenses in linux gatway, and tested their
compatibility by querying the real DNS servers on the Internet. Implementing
solutions in the gateway has several advantages, over implementations in the
resolver itself, which we discuss in Section 3.
1.1 Firewall-Based Defense Mechanisms
Anti-poisoning defenses implemented in firewall have several advantages over
defenses in the resolver:
– Integration Challenges: resolver software may not be amenable to modification
due to complexity or due to it being proprietary, while modifications in the
firewall are simpler, as firewalls already have built in tools to capture packets.
The modification can be made in a small user-space program (as we did for our
experimental validation of the prevention techniques), which is much simpler
than modifying the resolver.
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– One Firewall Protects Many: one firewall, e.g., of ISP, can protect all the DNS
resolvers, e.g., of ISP’s clients, without the need to integrate the changes in
all the local DNS resolvers.
– Modular Design: If a DNS server is replaced, or a new server is added, there
is no need to integrate the modification each time.
– Security Feature: for firewall vendors, adding another security feature is an
important added value.
1.2 Contributions and Organisation
We present two practical and efficient defense mechanisms against DNS poison-
ing, that require changes only to the local DNS resolver and protect the local
DNS resolver against poisoning attacks by spoofing adversaries. Our defenses
can be implemented in the firewall. The sandwich antidote (Section 3) is simple
to implement and integrate in a gateway which connects the network to the
Internet, requires modest resources, and can provide sufficient entropy to make
poisoning infeasible. The NAT antidote (Section 4) is very simple to deploy,
with almost negligible overhead, and in many cases, provided a significant num-
ber of client IP addresses are available, can significantly improve defense against
poisoning.
In Section 2 we discuss and compare recently proposed antidotes to DNS
poisoning.
Finally, in Section 5, we show how birthday protection can be efficiently
implemented in a firewall, which is significant since most existing resolvers only
limit the amount of duplicates, e.g., to 200.
We present the implementations of our proposed defenses in Linux based
firewall.
2 Proposed Antidotes to DNS Poisoning
In this section we briefly review proposed anti-poisoning defenses against spoofers,
that require integration on the side of the local DNS resolver only. These tech-
niques can be broadly categorised as follows: (1) mechanisms that increase en-
tropy in DNS packets (subsection 2.1), and (2) mechanisms that inspect the
DNS responses to detect forgery (subsection 2.2).
2.1 Entropy Increasing Mechanisms
Unilateral entropy increasing mechanisms, most notably: source port randomi-
sation (SPR) [9], source/destination IP address randomisation (IPR) and DNS
0x20 encoding [14], add more randomness to DNS packets, in order to make
it more difficult for the spoofing adversary to craft a valid DNS response, that
would get accepted and cached by the local DNS resolver. In order to produce
a successful forgery the attacker has to guess all the values in the validation
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fields correctly. The more random values pertain in the DNS requests, the lower
the probability of the attacker to produce a successful guess. Entropy increasing
mechanisms do not try to identify forgery attacks and respond to them, but
attempt to increase the difficulty of producing a successful forgery.
Unfortunately, the number of fields in the DNS packet, that could be used
to add randomness, is limited: the transaction ID field in the DNS packet, the
source port, source/destination IP addresses, and the choice of upper/lower case
for the query (since DNS is case-insensitive; this is the field used by DNS 0x20
encoding).
Port Randomisation Following to Kaminsky attack, [20], the need to patch
the DNS resolvers to send DNS requests from random ports became apparent.
Using random source ports adds another 16 bits of entropy, resulting in a search
space of 216×216 = 234 bits, which makes successful poisoning significantly more
difficult to achieve.
Unfortunately, source port randomisation (SPR) is resource intensive, and as
noted in [13, 15] may be inappropriate for busy DNS servers or embedded devices.
In addition, as pointed out by [14], determined attackers can overcome source
port randomisation, by sending large amounts of traffic, e.g., from many zombie
computers, thus covering all the search space and eventually producing a valid
DNS response. Therefore, enhancing DNS security using SPR and transaction
ID alone may not suffice.
Furthermore, many (or most) DNS resolvers are located behind NAT devices,
and as [12, 10] noted, NAT devices that use sequential assignment of external
ports, may expose (even the patched) local DNS resolvers, to poisoning attacks,
since NAT could reduce source port randomisation implemented by the local
resolvers.
IP Randomisation IP addresses are known to be a scarce resource on the
Internet. IP address is composed of 32 bits, resulting in at most 232 possible
addresses. Due to this shortcoming, the DNS resolvers are often allocated a single
IP address, and authority DNS servers are allocated at most 3 IP addresses.
This can increase the search space of the attacker by at most a factor of 1× 3,
which does not offer sufficient protection. In addition, the DNS resolvers that are
located behind NAT devices, which is the typical case, lose the IP randomisation,
even if they are allocated several IP addresses.
DNS 0x20 Encoding Dagon et al. [14] present an innovative technique, 0x20-
encoding, for improving DNS defense by increasing entropy of DNS queries
against poisoning by spoofed responses. The technique is based on an observa-
tion that domain names are case insensitive, however, most authoritative servers
copy the string of the domain name from the incoming request to the response
they send back, exactly as sent - preserving the case of each letter. They sug-
gest to randomly toggle the case of letters of which the domain name consists,
and validate them in response. If the domain name d contains l(d) alphabetic
characters, this increases the space of identifiers by factor of X(d) = 2l(d), e.g.,
X(www.google.com) = 212 and X(a9.com) = 24.
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Note that in Kaminsky-style attacks, the query is for a non-existing do-
main name chosen by the attacker, e.g., to poison addresses in the domain
google.com, an attacker may issue a query for r.google.com where r ∈R
{0, . . . , 9}8 is a random string of 8 digits, resulting in a domain name with only
9 letters, i.e., factor of only X = 29; namely, 0x20 encoding is less effective
for domain names containing few letters - which are often the most important
domains, e.g., the Top Level Domains (TLDs) such as .com and .uk.
Although 0x20 encoding, as presented by Dagon et al., introduces significant
extra entropy to DNS requests, an attacker may still be able to poison ‘high value’
domain names with a rather small factor of poisoned responses. Therefore, there
is need in alternative or additional technique to protect the TLDs and other
domain names containing only few letters, e.g., a9.com.
2.2 Forgery Detection Mechanisms
The ‘forgery detection’ mechanisms follow two approaches: the collaborative ap-
proach and techniques from machine learning. According to the collaborative
approach the authenticity of a DNS response is validated by distributing the
DNS requests across hosts in the system, e.g., [22, 25, 28], or by consulting a set
of trusted peers, [31], and then, e.g., taking the majority answer. CoDNS, Con-
fiDNS and DoX, [22, 25, 31], send the requests to several peers in a peer-to-peer
network and accept the first DNS response; if the first response is forged, it is
still accepted. DepenDNS, [28], queries several DNS resolvers, and accepts the
DNS response of the majority. DepenDNS relies on open recursive DNS resolvers
to obtain DNS responses; open recursion DNS services are known to expose DNS
to attacks. Furthermore, recently, [2] showed that DepenDNS does not protect
DNS against poisoning attacks. The common shortcomings of the collaborative
approach are most notably the performance penalty, i.e., additional processing
and communication delays, that they introduce to every DNS request, even when
the system is not under attack, and the significant infrastructure that is required
for deployment. In addition, techniques that are based on distributing the DNS
request to several nodes, e.g., [22], are also exposed to cache poisoning attacks,
as the first DNS response that arrives is accepted.
A recent technique, by Antonakakis et al [3], employs mechanisms from ma-
chine learning to identify suspicious IP addresses. Specifically, [3] designed a
centralised poisoning detection system called Anax, which is based on the ob-
servation that DNS records direct users to a known set of NS records, while
poisoned records redirect users to new IP addresses, outside of the victim’s ad-
dress space. However, deployment requires trust in one central entity that should
be consulted to establish authenticity of the DNS responses. In addition, this
mechanism also introduces delays and may have false positives, e.g., if an au-
thority DNS server was moved to a new IP address for load distribution.
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3 The Sandwich Antidote to DNS Poisoning
Both categories, the increasing entropy (Section 2.1) and the forgery detection
(Section 2.2) mechanisms, have different shortcomings and most importantly:
the DNS cache poisoning problem is not yet solved, thus motivating further
investigation of anti-poisoning defenses.
In this section we present an anti-poisoning defense technique, the sandwich
antidote, designated to run in a gateway (or a proxy), behind which the local
DNS resolver is located, and should filter DNS traffic. The sandwich antidote is
applied only to DNS packets and is based on first detecting and then activating
the prevention module, to counter poisoning attempts. As a result, the mech-
anism does not impose performance overhead, and is only applied when DNS
cache poisoning attack is detected. The sandwich antidote maintains a table that
stores all outbound DNS requests, prior to forwarding them. It also keeps track
of the inbound DNS responses, and matches them against the pending DNS re-
quests. If a corresponding DNS request exists, and the DNS response is correct,
i.e., all the validation fields match the corresponding values in the DNS request,
then the entry is removed from the table and the response is forwarded to the
DNS resolver.
A poisoning attack is detected when one of the validation fields, e.g., trans-
action ID, in a DNS response does not match2 the corresponding value in the
pending DNS request, in which case, the prevention module is activated. During
the course of the poisoning attack many invalid DNS responses for some DNS
request may arrive. Among these incorrect responses a valid response may ap-
pear, however, with high probability this can be a forged response generated
by the attacker. Therefore, once an attack was detected, i.e., an incorrect DNS
response was received for some pending query, the mechanism should not rely
on that (seemingly correct) DNS response, since it can be merely a successful
forgery sent by the attacker.
Once activated, the sandwich antidote issues three DNS requests, substi-
tuting the original DNS request sent by the resolver: (1) a DNS request for
the requested resource record, prepended with some random string, e.g., if
the original DNS request was for x.y.com, then after receiving an invalid
DNS response for query x.y.com, the mechanism should issue a request for
randomString1.x.y.com; (2) a DNS request for the original resource record,
i.e., x.y.com as above; (3) a DNS request for randomString2.x.y.com, where
randomString2 is a randomly selected string, and x.y.com is the RR as ap-
peared in the original DNS request.
The sandwich antidote expects to receive correct DNS responses to all three
requests and in the same order in which the requests were sent. Specifically,
it checks that the DNS responses to the above requests are correct, and arrive
in the same order, in which the requests were sent. This mechanism is based
2 Note that when generating a DNS response, the DNS servers copy the validation
fields from the DNS request accurately, thus it is guaranteed that the validation
fields should appear correct in the authentic DNS response.
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on the observation that it may be possible to generate a single correct DNS
response, to a potentially adversarial query. However, generating three correct
DNS responses, where the first and third are random, should not be feasible, let
alone ensuring that all three are received in the same order in which they were
sent. The authentic responses to those three DNS requests above should be: (1)
an nxdomain (i.e., with high probability the hostname randomString1.x.y.com
does not exist) or an NS RR, i.e., a referral to a name server lower in hierarchy,
e.g., from ns.com to ns.y.com; (2) an A RR (IP address for x.y.com, or an
NS RR, i.e., a referral to the DNS lower in hierarchy; (3) same as (1) above,
i.e., an nxdomain or an NS RR. Note that as a result of this ‘order preserving’
mechanism, where the original query is between two queries prepended with a
random prefix, we coin this mechanism the ‘sandwich antidote’.
Once correct DNS responses arrive in the required order, for all three DNS
requests, the mechanism removes the pending DNS requests from the table and
returns the DNS response to the DNS resolver. The sandwich mechanism ignores
the responses if they arrive in an incorrect order, or if the validation fields do
not match. The diagram describing the functionality of the sandwich antidote
is in Figure 3. Due to length restrictions, the pseudo-code appears in the full
version of the paper.
Note that similarly to other unilateral defenses, such as SPR or 0x20 encod-
ing, the sandwich antidote does not offer protection when it is implemented in
a resolver (or a firewall) which uses a higher level resolver as a forwarder, e.g.,
receives services from the resolver of an ISP.
In subsequent sections we present a detailed design of the sandwich mech-
anism. We discuss the additional overhead that our mechanism inflicts on the
gateway and analyse the impact of the sandwich mechanism on the probability
of the attacker to produce a successful forgery. We also show that our mecha-
nism does not expose the DNS resolver (or its clients) to denial of service (DoS)
attacks.
3.1 Detailed Design
In order to keep track of the outbound DNS requests and to record the poison-
ing attempts, the mechanism maintains two tables: the table T that stores all
outbound DNS requests (for which a valid DNS response has not arrived yet),
and the table A that maintains the DNS requests for which poisoning attempts
were detected.
Table T is illustrated in Table 1. The table which is indexed by a hash
function h applied on the query field of the DNS request. Upon arrival of a
DNS request Req, the hash h(Req.query) is stored in table T and is mapped to
the validation fields, i.e., source port srcPort, source/destination IP addresses
srcIP and dstIP , and DNS 0x20 encoding bits X:
T[h(Req.query)]=(srcPort||srcIP ||dstIP ||X). Namely, the table T is composed
of the indices column containing a digest of the query, and a column for each
‘validation’ field, and a serial number (which is used to locate the entry in T from
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table A). Table T can contain entries with the same index3, i.e., when several
DNS requests for the same RR were issued simultaneously.
Table A is illustrated in Table 2. Table A maintains DNS requests which
were issued once forgery attempt was detected for some DNS request. Table A
is composed of indices column h(Req.query), a column containing a fingerprint,
i.e., the result of a PRF (pseudo-random function) f applied on the entropy
fields T[h(Req.query)]=fK(srcPort||srcIP ||dstIP ||X), and a column containing
a serial number pointing to the corresponding entry in T (required to generate
the DNS response once responses for corresponding entries in A were received).
Specifically, once an invalid DNS response arrives for an existing, pending DNS
request, the mechanism issues three DNS requests, and stores them in A.
The diagram, in Figure 3, describes the functionality of the sandwich anti-
dote. Upon receipt of a DNS response, in step (1), the mechanism checks if an
entry for that query exists in table A, in 2, step (2).
If no matching entry exists in A, however a corresponding DNS requests is
stored in T , Table 1, step (3), i.e., the DNS request was issued, the DNS response
is checked (the validation fields are compared against those in the pending DNS
request), step (4). If the response is correct, it is sent to resolver, and the pending
DNS request is removed from table T . If the response is incorrect, e.g., the
destination port in the response does not match the source port in the DNS
request, attack is detected, and prevention module is triggered. Specifically, the
mechanism issues three DNS requests, such that the DNS request containing
the original query, is sent between two other DNS requests that contain random
strings prepended to the original query: (a) $1.||Resp.query, (b) Resp.query, (c)
$2.||Resp.query, s.t., request (b) contains the original query as appeared in the
DNS request, and (a) and (c) contain the original request prepended with distinct
random strings $1 and $2. These queries are stored in table A, and further DNS
responses for that query will be processed against these entries in A.
If a matching entry exists in A, an attack was detected, i.e., at least one
DNS response containing wrong values in the validation fields was received; the
mechanism should not accept the DNS response as is, but should apply a special
processing described next. In this case, the mechanism first checks that the
validation fields match against those in the corresponding entry in A, step (5),
and that the DNS response arrived in the correct order, i.e., according to the
order in which the DNS requests were sent, step (6).
We implemented steps (5) and (6) as a state machine, Figure 2. The state
machine is activated following to attack detection and transmission of three DNS
requests (as above). The state machine transits to subsequent states following
to successful receipt of the DNS response, i.e., in order and correct. The state
machine halts when step 4., Figure 2, is reached. Then the DNS response, for
3 Following to Kaminsky attack, DNS resolvers were patched to support birthday
protection, we extend more on this in Section 5, and we also show a gateway based
mechanism to restrict the number of outstanding DNS requests to 1 to prevent the
birthday paradox.
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the corresponding DNS request stored in T , is sent to the DNS resolver, and the
respective entries are removed from A and T .
1 2 3 4
- Attack was detected
- send: 
   “$1.”||Resp.query
   Resp.query
   “$2.”||Resp.query
Valid DNS 
response  for 
“$1.”||Resp.query
Valid DNS 
response  for 
Resp.query
Valid DNS 
response  for 
“$2.”||Resp.query
Fig. 2. The state machine of the sandwich antidote, that corresponds to steps (5) and (6) in
Figure 3.
Index Serial number Transaction ID Source IP Destination IP Source port 0x20 encoding
h(‘WWw.GOoGLe.COM’) i 12567 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8 55555 110110110111
h(‘WwW.yAhOO.coM’) i + 1 35783 1.2.3.4 7.8.9.7 61345 10101011001
h(‘Www.msn.COm’) i + 2 22344 1.2.3.3 2.6.8.3 24580 100000110
Table 1. Sample entries, containing the DNS request sent by the DNS resolver, in the table T
maintained by the sandwich antidote mechanism running at the gateway; for simplicity the entries
are presented using ASCII characters.
Index Serial Fingerprint
number
h(‘wAKjfruEHa.WWw.GOoGLe.COM’) i.1 fK(12567||1.2.3.4||5.6.7.8||44563||0110000111110110110111)
h(‘wWw.gOOGlE.cOm’) i.2 fK(23455||1.2.3.4||5.6.7.8||1089||010011101010)
h(‘OknfDEJFNa.wwW.gOogle.CoM’) i.3 fK(12577||1.2.3.4||5.6.7.8||54333||1000111110001010000101)
Table 2. Sample entries in table A, containing the DNS request sent by the sandwich an-
tidote mechanism, running at the gateway, once forgery attempt was detected for DNS query
‘www.google.com’; for simplicity the entries are presented using ASCII characters.
3.2 Sandwich Implementation in Firewall
We implemented the sandwich antidote in C and ran it as a user-space program
on Linux Netfilter (kernel 2.6) operating system. We added two rules to iptables
firewall, one to capture all outbound packets destined to port 53 and another
to capture all inbound packets originating from port 53. The kernel passed the
captured packets to the implementation, which queued them, and applied to
each packet the processing described in Section 3.1.
We tested that the sandwich antidote does not impose overhead to DNS or
other traffic and that it does not ‘break’ the DNS functionality in two settings:
without poisoning attack and when under attack.
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Send three requests with: 
“ $1.” ||Resp.query
Resp.query
“ $2.” ||Resp.query
Add to A each request
Send three requests with: 
“ $1.” ||Resp.query
Resp.query
“ $2.” ||Resp.query
Add to A each request
no
2.
Resp.query 
exists in A
yes
yes
1.
DNS response Resp 
arrives
1.
DNS response Resp 
arrives
yes3.
Resp.query 
exists in T
yes
4. 
Validation fields in Resp 
match values in 
T[h(Resp.query)]
If entry for Resp.query exists in A
Then poisoning attack was 
detected.
Send Resp to resolver
Remove Resp from T
Send Resp to resolver
Remove Resp from T
no
Check if request with 
query matching the query
in response was sent.
Validation fields in response
match the fields in request
Poisoning attack 
was detected
6.
all responses for Resp.query 
arrived in order
yes
Ignore response
Remove Resp from T
Remove Resp entries 
from A
Ignore response
Remove Resp from T
Remove Resp entries 
from A
Ignore
Ignore
no
noIgnore
Ignore
no
Send Resp to resolver
Remove Resp from T
Remove Resp entires 
from A
Send Resp to resolver
Remove Resp from T
Remove Resp entires 
from A
5.
Validation fields in Resp match 
values in 
A[h(Resp.query)]
Fig. 3. A flow of the defense mechanism in firewall of the local resolver. The flow describes the
steps taken by the firewall upon arrival of each DNS response.
Compatibility with DNS Infrastructure When our resolver was configured
to use a forwarder, in some cases the responses did not arrive in correct order.
This is due to the fact that many domains were already in cache of the for-
warder, while the two random queries did not exist. Thus the two responses for
random queries would arrive after the response to the original DNS request. To
adapt the mechanism to such settings, where the local resolver uses a forwarder,
we modified the implementation to issue the requests twice. Specifically, if the
responses do not arrive in correct order, the same three DNS requests (random,
original, random) are issued again.
Efficiency When no attack is detected, the mechanism does not impose de-
lays on other (non-DNS) traffic. The delays on DNS packets were in order of
few microseconds. To reduce even these (negligible) delays we added a slight
optimisation to our original design: we modified the firewall rule to duplicate
the outbound DNS packets, then to forward, in parallel, the DNS packet to the
destination (on the Internet) and a copy thereof for processing to the user-space
implementation.
4 The NAT Antidote
RFC 5452 [18] recommends that when sending a query, DNS resolvers should use
a random source IP address (from a list of IP addresses allocated to the resolver)
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and a random destination IP address (from the list of addresses of authoritative
servers for the domain). Upon receiving a response, resolvers should validate it
matches the query, in their source and destination IP addresses (as well as in
the resolver’s port, DNS query identifier, and case-sensitive query). Validation
of IP addresses increases the entropy and makes poisoning by spoofed responses
harder. Specifically, if nR (nA) is the number of addresses used for resolver
(respectively, authority DNS), then the improvement is by factor nR × nA.
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1e+06
20 25 210 215 220 225
Fig. 4. Statistics of the top 100,000 domains according to Alexa, and the size of
addresses blocks allocated to them. The X-asis denote the size of the IP addresses block
and Y-axis denote the number of networks that have that number of IP addresses.
However, typically, only a small number of IP addresses nR, nA are used for
resolver and authority DNS; e.g., Dagon et al. [14] mention typical values of
nR = 1 and nA = 3. Clearly, increasing nR and nA would improve resistance to
poisoning; however, IP addresses is a scarce, expensive resource, hence allocating
additional IP addresses to the DNS servers is hard to justify. On the other hand,
often, a domain may have multiple IP addresses used for other purposes (not
resolver), e.g., an ISP may have many IP addresses allocated to clients, and a
company may have special IP addresses allocated to different publicly-available
servers. The NAT antidotes takes advantage of such addresses. Specifically, we
show how to add IP addresses to DNS resolver without allocating additional IP
addresses. The idea is to reuse IP addresses already allocated to the network.
Hence this method works for networks that have a large set of public IP ad-
dresses; fortunately, this holds for networks of many organisations and ISPs; see
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Figure 4 summarising the IP range blocks for top 100, 000 domains according to
Alexa [1], which we used in order to form a dataset. We gathered this informa-
tion by running a script on the list of domains (freely available on Alexa); the
script employed the whois service in order to obtain the IP address block of the
domain. According to our survey the median is at 211 which indicates that most
domains have a sufficiently large block of IP addresses. The deployment of NAT
antidote only requires modifications in the router(s) connecting the organisation
to the Internet, much like commonly used network address translation (NAT)
and firewall devices. Indeed, sometimes all that is required is to use existing
overloading many-to-many NAT functionality.
If necessary, implementation is similar to NAT, using tools such as iptables.
Figure 5 illustrates typical operation of the NAT antidote.
src=5.6 .7.8 : srcPort
dst=1.2 .4 .1 :53
Query=A? x.y.com
src=5.6 .7.8 : srcPort
dst=1.2 .4 .1 :53
Query=A? x.y.comIf destined to Port 53
Send to NAT newPort=getFreePort()
newIP=getRandomIP()
T[newPort]=(srcIP,port)
src=1.2 .4 .1 :53
dst=5.6 .7 .8 : srcPort
Query=A? x.y.com
Answer=x.y.com A1.2.4 .6
(srcIP,srcPort)=T[newPort]
Free newIP
Free newPort
IP=srcIP
Port=srcPort
InternetLAN 5.6.7.0/24
NATNAT
Auth DNS
ns.y.com
1.2.4.1
Auth DNS
ns.y.com
1.2.4.1
src=1.2 .4 .1 :53
dst=newIP :newPort
Query=A? x.y.com
Answer=x.y.com A1.2.4 .6
If from port 53
Forward 
to NAT
If from NAT
Forward to 
destination
src=newIP :newPort
dst=1.2.4 .1 :53
Query=A? x.y.com
Gateway
5.6.7.0/24
src=newIP :newPort
dst=1.2.4 .1 :53
Query=A? x.y.com
src=1.2 .4 .1 :53
dst=newIP :newPort
Query=A? x.y.com
Answer=x.y.com A1.2.4 .6
src=1.2 .4 .1 :53
dst=5.6 .7 .8 : srcPort
Query=A? x.y.com
Answer=x.y.com A1.2.4 .6
If from NAT
Forward to
destination
Local DNS
Resolver
5.6.7.8
Local DNS
Resolver
5.6.7.8
Fig. 5. The NAT Antidote, implementing the defense against DNS cache poisoning by increasing
the amount of source IP addresses, used by the local DNS resolver, to the number of addresses
allocated to the network. The NAT antidotes connects a network (e.g., 5.6.7.0/24) to the Internet.
The NAT maps a DNS request, sent by the resolver to authority DNS, to a random IP address in the
network; the NAT also changes the source port to some random, free port number, and saves this
entry to a table. This allows the NAT to change the destination IP and port, in the DNS response,
to the values that were originally used by the local DNS resolver.
4.1 NAT Implementation in Firewall
The NAT antidote is a variant of many-to-many, overloading NAT functionality,
i.e., mapping a set of internal IP addresses to a set of external IP address. Upon
receiving a DNS request (to port 53), the firewall would perform a special type
of Network Address Translation function. Specifically, it changes the IP address,
of the outbound DNS requests, to a random IP address in the available range,
stores the mapping (between the source IP, source Port, destination IP), and
forwards the packet to the DNS server. When the DNS response arrives, the
firewall locates the corresponding entry according to the destination IP and
port, and changes the destination port and IP address to those that were used
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by the resolver. It then removes the stored entry and sends the DNS response;
see Figure 5.
5 Birthday Paradox and Protection
Originally, DNS servers did not restrict the number of simultaneous, multiple
DNS requests for the same IP address. This allowed a mathematical paradox,
known as the ”Birthday Paradox”, to reduce the number of DNS responses
required for a successful poisoning. To exploit the birthday paradox one has to
send a sufficient number of queries to a DNS server, while sending an equal
number of forged DNS responses at the same time. The greater the number of
outgoing DNS requests, the greater the probability that the attacker will match
one of those requests with a forged DNS response. As an example assume that
only the transaction ID (16 bits long) is randomised in the DNS request, and
that the attacker sends n responses to a DNS request; the success probability of
a match of one the responses with the DNS request is n216 . If the attacker issues
n requests for the same domain, and sends n responses, then the probability of
a collision of one of the responses with one of the DNS request (with a random
transaction ID) is: 1−
(
1− 1216
)n(n−1)/2
. For instance, for n = 300 there is a 50%
success probability for a match and for n = 700 there is almost 100% success,
while without the birthday paradox the success probability is 700/216 = 0.01,
e.g., see [27].
Following to Kaminsky attack, many DNS resolvers were also improved to
support birthday protection: prevent or limit 4 duplicate concurrent requests.
In subsequent section we suggest a mechanism that completely prevents the
birthday paradox.
5.1 Birthday Protection
Spoofing attacker can significantly increase its success probability of poisoning
the cache of local DNS resolver by issuing a number of DNS requests for the same
resource record, thus taking advantage of the birthday paradox. Birthday protec-
tion limits the number of concurrent DNS requests for the same record. However,
not all DNS servers implement birthday protection, or sufficiently restrict the
number of DNS queries. We suggest to implement the birthday protection mech-
anism in the firewall, without requiring modification to the local resolver itself.
The idea is to limit multiple duplicate DNS requests, for the same RR (resource
record) to one, by having the firewall return a single DNS response, i.e., the first
one that arrives, and to ignore the rest.
The birthday protection mechanism should run at the gateway (or a proxy
DNS server, through which the local resolver will issue DNS requests and receive
4 Complete prevention of duplicate queries may have a significant overhead, hence
many implementations only limit duplicates, e.g., to 200.
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DNS responses). The gateway should capture DNS requests and responses, by
adding appropriate rules to the firewall, and should keep track of the outbound
DNS requests. Specifically, when a packet destined to port 53 enters the network
interface card (NIC) eth0, (as in Figure 1), the firewall captures and queues it
for processing by a waiting userspace birthday protection mechanism implemen-
tation. The mechanism maintains a table (see Table 3 for sample entries) of DNS
requests and when a new request arrives it is stored in the table. The mechanism
then checks if a DNS request with the same query already exists in table. If the
request is new and does not exist in a table, the first flag is set to 1, i.e., this
is the first DNS request. Then the birthday protection mechanism forwards it
to the designated recipient; otherwise, the first is set to 0 and the request is
discarded. When a DNS response arrives from 53 the firewall passes it to the
birthday protection mechanism. If a matching entry exists with a flag set to 1
the mechanism processes the response (otherwise ignores it). Taking only the re-
sponse that matches the first query is important to prevent the attack exploiting
the birthday paradox. For each entry in a table with a query that matches the
query in the DNS response, the mechanism constructs a DNS response with the
fields, e.g., port, source/destination IP, that correspond to the values in table,
and uses the same answer field value from the DNS response that it received; it
then sends the responses and removes the corresponding entries from the table.
All future DNS responses for that RR will be ignored (since no matching entry
exists in the table).
It may seem that the mechanism should only return the response to one of the
matching DNS requests, and ignore the rest of the requests. However, depending
on the implementation of the DNS resolver, when several clients make requests
for the same resource record (RR), the resolver does not return the first (cached)
response to the other clients, but waits for the corresponding response to arrive.
Therefore, our mechanism crafts a matching DNS response to every pending
DNS request. Therefore, our mechanism returns a matching DNS response to
each pending entry.
Index Query ID source IP destination IP source Port 0x20 Encoding first
h(‘www.google.com’) 12567 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8 55555 1101101101 1
h(‘www.google.com’) 2234 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.9 3112 1101100011 0
Table 3. Sample entries in the table maintained by the birthday protection mechanism; for sim-
plicity the entries are presented using ASCII characters.
6 Conclusions
Currently, many DNS resolvers are still vulnerable to DNS poisoning attacks by
determined adversaries, only requiring from them the ability to spoof packets.
DNS poisoning can be used for a wide range of devastating attacks, hence, it
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is essential to develop interim solutions, to ensure security until the long-term
cryptographic DNS-security mechanisms are widely deployed. Preferably, such
interim antidotes to DNS poisoning should require changes only in the resolver,
or, better yet, only in the gateway connecting the resolver to the Internet.
We investigated unilateral defenses against the DNS cache poisoning by
spoofing adversaries, and presented new and improved mechanisms. Our cen-
tral contribution is the sandwich antidote to DNS poisoning, which operates in
two phases: detecting and then preventing poisoning attacks. We also presented
the NAT antidote, which enhances DNS security by increasing the entropy in
DNS packets for most subnets by a factor of 211, by picking a random source IP
address from a pool of addresses available to the organisation. These solutions
can be easily deployed in gateways (we present proof of concept code), to provide
immediate defense against DNS poisoning.
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